Course title: Thinking about Reasoning
Date: May 2005
This essay is about a section "Science and Superstition," in A Concise Introduction to Logic, written by Hurley. I will first summarise his main claims, then identify and critically assess three of his arguments and finally evaluate his reasoning as a conclusion.
Hurley starts the section "Science and Superstition" by saying that the difference or contrast of science and superstition is similar to Plato's differentiation between knowledge and opinion (2003, p.564). He then divides the discussion into three criteria: evidentiary support, objectivity and integrity. The evidentiary support of hypotheses is a main restriction in science; on the other hand, it is usually ignored in superstition (2003, p.565). Before discussing the need for evidence, Hurley stresses that science is about discovering the natural world, therefore "only observations of the natural world count as evidence." Replicability distinguishes science from superstitious. Scientific experiments are tested and repeated by different experimenter at different time and places. Scientific results hold under controlled conditions while superstitious hypotheses do not (2003, p.566). Moreover, superstitious hypotheses are often blur and ambiguous; conversely, scientific hypotheses are often formulated into mathematical expression which gives precise formulas (2003, p.567). Karl Popper's falsifiability criterion is mentioned. Popper claims that "the [scientific] hypothesis must be framed narrowly enough so that it's possible for evidence to count against it," as Hurley says (2003, p.568). Ad hoc modifications are concerned because when they are added, the hypothesis is merely describing things rather than explaining. Turn simple things complicated is another problem with ad hoc modifications (2003, p.568). The last point of evidentiary support is that science is progressive while superstition is not. One can predicts that light is affected by gravity, as a consequence of Einstein's general theory of relativity (2003, p.569). Hurley suggests that human beliefs are objective, scientist try not to be distorted by experiencing subject, but superstitious mind accepted them (2003, p.569). Human have little control over death, even science could not defeat disease and death. Fear and anxiety are therefore generated, hence superstitions exist in order to satisfy emotional needs. Many people enjoy watching and hearing magical and mysterious stuff, in spite of the fact that the demonstration was really a fake (2003, p.570). Sloppy thinking is easily arisen and leads informal fallacies such as false cause, hasty generalization and appeal to the people (2003, p.571). What we observe about the world can be distorted by the influences of placebo effect and pareidolia. For the former effect, patient is told that an operation will cure them but indeed it does not. For the later effect, visual images are produced with something that we are familiar with. Moreover, we tend to predict new events by using our prior experience. So we usually perceive what we expected to (2003, p.571-573). Another factor distorts perception was hallucination, including hypnagogic, hypnopompic and collective. These hallucinations due with sleepy moments and large crowds of people (2003, p.573). The inaccurate of human memory, or the so-called confabulation, produces false recollections. This can be avoided by using instruments to record or store data (2003, p.574). Hurley states that superstitious practitioners often present without genuine evidence (2003, p.574). Once a scientific hypothesis is proposed, scientists turn into puzzle-solving mode, as Thomas Kuhn would have said. Unlike scientists, practitioners of superstition faked the evidence (2003, p.577). Hurley sums up this section by emphasising that the attempt to distinguish science from superstition has been addressed long time but no absolute or sharp distinction can be made (2003, p.579).
Hurley argues that evidentiary support is strictly obeyed in science (2003, p.565) because scientific experiments are replicable (2003, p.566), scientific hypotheses are formulated by mathematical expression precisely (2003, p.567) and science is progressive (2003, p.569). This is quite true for modern science. However, it was not until about sixteenth or seventeenth century that modern science was developed. According to Kane and Sternheim, Aristotle taught us that the earth is the centre of the universe and heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones. Copernicus proposed that the earth and other stars rotate on its axis and revolves about the sun. Galilei Galileo made a telescope and his observation proved that Copernicus was right. Galileo also performed some experiment to show that all objects have same acceleration, neglecting friction. Their theory was not widely accepted at that time as they contradict what Aristotle and the Church thought (1988, p.18). A majority of western scientists before the seventeenth century believed in Aristotle's view of four elements- earth, water, air and fire. Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, Antoine Lavoisier and John Dalton made the re-establishment on modern atomic theory. Dalton's theory is generally accepted in modern chemistry (Anderton, Garnett, Liddelow, Lowe and Manno, 1996, p.3-4). Since seventeenth century, modern scientists seek for replicable experiments and precise formulation. Modern scientific results are generally evidentiary supported, as Hurley claims. For instance, mathematicians would not accept Fermat's Last Theorem until they found a formal proof of it. Even it took more than three hundred years to find such proof.
Another Hurley's argument I would like to discuss is about perceptual Gestalt. He claims that such Gestalt affects our future perceptions. This lead us recognize, or notice, what we expect to recognize (2003, p.572). Gestalt, as defined by Koffka, is "a product of organization, organization the process that leads to a gestalt." And the process cannot be presented in a confused way (1955, p.682-683). Myers explains that our mind does not only read what we have seen. Organisation and interpretation are always held. Sensations are organised into Gestalt (2004, p.165). These are analogies with Hurley's claim. He explains clearly that expectations are led by pervious experience. Like problem or puzzle solving, a number of possible solutions come out at first. Then we will figure out which is the obvious one. Patterns are formed as perceptual Gestalt, which is used for perception. Further, he mentions the card games experiment performed by psychologists Jerome S. Bruner and Leo J. Postman (2003, p.572-573). The conclusion that "we perceive what we expect to perceive" is finely drawn with well-explained premises and qualified authority as an example. Given Gestalt is a kind of psychology, it is best due with psychologist. Generally, it would be silly to ask a geologist what Gestalt is, or to ask a historian how does quantum mechanics work.
Hurley also argues that most superstitious practitioners fake the evidence (2003, p.574). To avoid hasty generalisation, three illustrative examples are given. First, Israeli entertainer Uri Geller gave marvelous shows about moving things without touching the object. After watching Geller's shows, magician James Randi challenged Geller that he could perform Geller's tricks. Geller's tricks were exposed simply because they are not true. The second example is about fire-walking, which can be done once you master certain laws of physics. The third example concerns with fortune tellers, palm readers and mentalists. Realising that one's outlook, facial expression, gestures, etc. are closely related to his personality, intelligence, religion, etc. the reader can keep track with his prediction. By broader and rephrasing the information, those readers easily amazed their client (2003, p.574-576). It can be seen that not only one particular group of practitioners of superstition fail to give real evidence. There are certain groups of practitioners cheated. As Hurley informs earlier in his book, fallacies occur when a non-representative or small sample is given (2003, p.134). Of course, one selected particular example does not imply anything. Even if it does, the implication is not strong. On the other hand, we may draw conclusion if large group of sample is randomly selected. Such conclusion is likely true, though not always. That is why Hurley uses the word "most." Moreover, the three examples are highly related to what he argues. Given the premises are true and relevant, the conclusion is well supported.
On the whole, Hurley successfully outlines the main difference and contrast between science and superstition. He first claims that the evidentiary support is obeyed in scientific hypotheses but not in superstitious one. The reasons he gives, like replicability, precise formulation and progression, are connected nicely and together support his claim. The second main claim is that scientists avoid emotional observation while superstitious minds do not. He then focuses why are people attracted by the mysterious and discusses few ways of distortions, such as hallucination and confabulation. The premises, step by step, explain the conclusion. Lack of integrity in superstition is the last main claim. Again, this is supported by relevant reasons like fake evidence and failure of logic. Hurley's analyses are objective. Also, informal fallacies are often avoided. For instance, words are used coherently and unambiguous. Consequently, conclusions are clearly presented, followed by relevant reasons or examples.
Hurley starts the section "Science and Superstition" by saying that the difference or contrast of science and superstition is similar to Plato's differentiation between knowledge and opinion (2003, p.564). He then divides the discussion into three criteria: evidentiary support, objectivity and integrity. The evidentiary support of hypotheses is a main restriction in science; on the other hand, it is usually ignored in superstition (2003, p.565). Before discussing the need for evidence, Hurley stresses that science is about discovering the natural world, therefore "only observations of the natural world count as evidence." Replicability distinguishes science from superstitious. Scientific experiments are tested and repeated by different experimenter at different time and places. Scientific results hold under controlled conditions while superstitious hypotheses do not (2003, p.566). Moreover, superstitious hypotheses are often blur and ambiguous; conversely, scientific hypotheses are often formulated into mathematical expression which gives precise formulas (2003, p.567). Karl Popper's falsifiability criterion is mentioned. Popper claims that "the [scientific] hypothesis must be framed narrowly enough so that it's possible for evidence to count against it," as Hurley says (2003, p.568). Ad hoc modifications are concerned because when they are added, the hypothesis is merely describing things rather than explaining. Turn simple things complicated is another problem with ad hoc modifications (2003, p.568). The last point of evidentiary support is that science is progressive while superstition is not. One can predicts that light is affected by gravity, as a consequence of Einstein's general theory of relativity (2003, p.569). Hurley suggests that human beliefs are objective, scientist try not to be distorted by experiencing subject, but superstitious mind accepted them (2003, p.569). Human have little control over death, even science could not defeat disease and death. Fear and anxiety are therefore generated, hence superstitions exist in order to satisfy emotional needs. Many people enjoy watching and hearing magical and mysterious stuff, in spite of the fact that the demonstration was really a fake (2003, p.570). Sloppy thinking is easily arisen and leads informal fallacies such as false cause, hasty generalization and appeal to the people (2003, p.571). What we observe about the world can be distorted by the influences of placebo effect and pareidolia. For the former effect, patient is told that an operation will cure them but indeed it does not. For the later effect, visual images are produced with something that we are familiar with. Moreover, we tend to predict new events by using our prior experience. So we usually perceive what we expected to (2003, p.571-573). Another factor distorts perception was hallucination, including hypnagogic, hypnopompic and collective. These hallucinations due with sleepy moments and large crowds of people (2003, p.573). The inaccurate of human memory, or the so-called confabulation, produces false recollections. This can be avoided by using instruments to record or store data (2003, p.574). Hurley states that superstitious practitioners often present without genuine evidence (2003, p.574). Once a scientific hypothesis is proposed, scientists turn into puzzle-solving mode, as Thomas Kuhn would have said. Unlike scientists, practitioners of superstition faked the evidence (2003, p.577). Hurley sums up this section by emphasising that the attempt to distinguish science from superstition has been addressed long time but no absolute or sharp distinction can be made (2003, p.579).
Hurley argues that evidentiary support is strictly obeyed in science (2003, p.565) because scientific experiments are replicable (2003, p.566), scientific hypotheses are formulated by mathematical expression precisely (2003, p.567) and science is progressive (2003, p.569). This is quite true for modern science. However, it was not until about sixteenth or seventeenth century that modern science was developed. According to Kane and Sternheim, Aristotle taught us that the earth is the centre of the universe and heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones. Copernicus proposed that the earth and other stars rotate on its axis and revolves about the sun. Galilei Galileo made a telescope and his observation proved that Copernicus was right. Galileo also performed some experiment to show that all objects have same acceleration, neglecting friction. Their theory was not widely accepted at that time as they contradict what Aristotle and the Church thought (1988, p.18). A majority of western scientists before the seventeenth century believed in Aristotle's view of four elements- earth, water, air and fire. Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, Antoine Lavoisier and John Dalton made the re-establishment on modern atomic theory. Dalton's theory is generally accepted in modern chemistry (Anderton, Garnett, Liddelow, Lowe and Manno, 1996, p.3-4). Since seventeenth century, modern scientists seek for replicable experiments and precise formulation. Modern scientific results are generally evidentiary supported, as Hurley claims. For instance, mathematicians would not accept Fermat's Last Theorem until they found a formal proof of it. Even it took more than three hundred years to find such proof.
Another Hurley's argument I would like to discuss is about perceptual Gestalt. He claims that such Gestalt affects our future perceptions. This lead us recognize, or notice, what we expect to recognize (2003, p.572). Gestalt, as defined by Koffka, is "a product of organization, organization the process that leads to a gestalt." And the process cannot be presented in a confused way (1955, p.682-683). Myers explains that our mind does not only read what we have seen. Organisation and interpretation are always held. Sensations are organised into Gestalt (2004, p.165). These are analogies with Hurley's claim. He explains clearly that expectations are led by pervious experience. Like problem or puzzle solving, a number of possible solutions come out at first. Then we will figure out which is the obvious one. Patterns are formed as perceptual Gestalt, which is used for perception. Further, he mentions the card games experiment performed by psychologists Jerome S. Bruner and Leo J. Postman (2003, p.572-573). The conclusion that "we perceive what we expect to perceive" is finely drawn with well-explained premises and qualified authority as an example. Given Gestalt is a kind of psychology, it is best due with psychologist. Generally, it would be silly to ask a geologist what Gestalt is, or to ask a historian how does quantum mechanics work.
Hurley also argues that most superstitious practitioners fake the evidence (2003, p.574). To avoid hasty generalisation, three illustrative examples are given. First, Israeli entertainer Uri Geller gave marvelous shows about moving things without touching the object. After watching Geller's shows, magician James Randi challenged Geller that he could perform Geller's tricks. Geller's tricks were exposed simply because they are not true. The second example is about fire-walking, which can be done once you master certain laws of physics. The third example concerns with fortune tellers, palm readers and mentalists. Realising that one's outlook, facial expression, gestures, etc. are closely related to his personality, intelligence, religion, etc. the reader can keep track with his prediction. By broader and rephrasing the information, those readers easily amazed their client (2003, p.574-576). It can be seen that not only one particular group of practitioners of superstition fail to give real evidence. There are certain groups of practitioners cheated. As Hurley informs earlier in his book, fallacies occur when a non-representative or small sample is given (2003, p.134). Of course, one selected particular example does not imply anything. Even if it does, the implication is not strong. On the other hand, we may draw conclusion if large group of sample is randomly selected. Such conclusion is likely true, though not always. That is why Hurley uses the word "most." Moreover, the three examples are highly related to what he argues. Given the premises are true and relevant, the conclusion is well supported.
On the whole, Hurley successfully outlines the main difference and contrast between science and superstition. He first claims that the evidentiary support is obeyed in scientific hypotheses but not in superstitious one. The reasons he gives, like replicability, precise formulation and progression, are connected nicely and together support his claim. The second main claim is that scientists avoid emotional observation while superstitious minds do not. He then focuses why are people attracted by the mysterious and discusses few ways of distortions, such as hallucination and confabulation. The premises, step by step, explain the conclusion. Lack of integrity in superstition is the last main claim. Again, this is supported by relevant reasons like fake evidence and failure of logic. Hurley's analyses are objective. Also, informal fallacies are often avoided. For instance, words are used coherently and unambiguous. Consequently, conclusions are clearly presented, followed by relevant reasons or examples.
Bibliography
Anderton, J.D., Garnett, P.J., Liddelow, W.R., Lowe, R.K. and Manno, I.J. (1996) Foundations of Chemistry. (2nd ed.) Melbourne: Pearson Longman.
Hurley, P.J. (2003) A Concise Introduction to Logic. (8th ed.) Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.
Kane, J.W. and Sternheim, M.M. (1988) Physics. (3rd ed.) New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Koffka, K. (1955) Principles of Gestalt Psychology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
Myers, D.G. (2004) Exploring Psychology. (6th ed.) New York: Worth Publishers.
