Is Darwin's Account of Evolution "Just a Theory"?

Course title: Science: Good, Bad & Bogus – an Introduction to the Philosophy of Science

Date: October 2005

Introduction

Creationists claim that evolution is "just a theory" and hence not a science (cited in Kitcher, 1982, p.31). Einstein's relativity, quantum theory and theoretical physics are all theories and science. There are many theories in science. What do Creationists really mean? Indeed, when Creationists uttered the word "theory", they meant an idea or a guess, which is not justifiable and hence not scientific. To avoid equivocation, one needs to distinguish the Creationists' "theory" from the scientific theory.

Who are Creationists? Basically, someone who believes in God can be considered to be a Creationist. Thus Creationists, in a broader sense, may not disagree with Darwin's evolution (Miller, 1984, p.21). In this essay, for the sake of simplicity, Creationists refer to the group that believe in Christian God and treat evolution as a "theory" in the sense discussed above.

Before answering the question, several issues need to be discussed. They are the basis the Origin of Species and Darwinian theory, the basis of Creation science; and the contrast between evolution and Creation science. Then, an example, the Arkansas trial, will be given. Finally, by analysing Kitcher's criteria for successful science and criticising Morris's attack on evolution, I will argue that Creationists' arguments are unsound.

The Origin of Species

Evolution was formulated in Charles Robert Darwin's book Origin of Species first published in 1859. Here is the basis of his idea.

Darwin divides his Origin of Species into fourteen chapters. Starting with "Variation Under Domestication," Darwin points out that the conditions of life causes variability. Variability is not an inherent and necessary contingency. It is ruled by dozens of unknown laws. Also, the intercrossing of species and aboriginally distinct are less important in the origin of domestic production (Darwin, 1964, p.43). "Variation Under Nature" is the discussion on individual differences. It is believed that individual of the same species are unlikely sort into the same mould (1964, p.45). The "distinction between species and varieties" are in fact unclear and unorganized (1964, p.48). This could be explained by "inevitably from the struggle of life." The variation, therefore, tend to preserve the individual and "will generally be inherited by its offspring." The probability of the offspring to survive is high. This is called Natural Selection (1964, p.61). The descendants can be modified and is diversified (1964, p.128). There exists a cause such that the offspring is slightly different from their parents (1964, p.170).

Darwin then turns into the Difficulties of the Theory. The central questions are: if species have descended from others with slight difference, why are not the transitional forms observable? Could a certain habit of species have been modified to an entirely new habit? "Can instinct be acquired and modified through natural selection?" The problem of hybridism is also addressed (1964, p.171-172). The process of natural selection is indeed very slow and this "implies the continual supplanting and extinction of preceding and intermediate gradations." Darwin stresses that "the most different habits of life could not graduate into each other." Every organic being tries to flight for their life and hence the habits can be changed under new conditions of life (1964, p.203-204). He answers the question of instinct by showing that the mental qualities of domestic animals and "the variations are inherited." Instincts would be vary in a state of nature (1964, p.242-243). The findings in the Hybridism chapter supports Darwin's view that "there is no fundamental distinction between species and varieties" (1964, p.278).

In the last few chapters, Darwin was concerned with geology and geography. He proposed that the geological record is far from perfect because human knowledge is limited to small portion of the world, small number of generations of species and short duration of formation, etc. (1964, p.341-342). The process of extinction of a group may be very slow. As an inevitable consequence, once a group wholly disappeared it will not reappear again (1964, p.343-344). Edward Forbes says that the governing laws of life are nearly the same throughout time and space (cited in Darwin, 1964, p.409). So, as Darwin suggests, there are common characters between species that belong to certain area or period of time (1964, p.410). He claims that all species in this world "have all descended, each within its own class or group, from common parents, and have all been modified in the course of descent" (1964, p.457-458).

Basis of Darwinian theory

Roughly speaking, there are two factors in the process of evolution: genetic variability and natural selection. The former is a matter of chance, while the later is an "anti-chance" factor. This dualism "gives evolution both its great flexibility and its goal-directedness" (Mayr, 1976, p.9-10). This is simple enough. Deeper understanding is essential for our discussion of the issue. Let us explore Darwinism theory a bit more.

The public understanding of the term "Darwinism" is sometimes ambiguous. One may simply refer Darwinism to the belief that man is descent from the apes. One may refer it to natural selection (Mayr, 1988, p.196). According to Ernst Mayr, Darwinian theory can be a combination of five theories: evolution as such, common descent, gradualism, multiplication of species, and natural selection (1988, p.198; 1992, p.36-37).

Evolution as such "is the theory that the world is neither constant nor perpetually cycling but rather is steadily and perhaps directionally changing, and that organisms are being transformed in time." This is no longer a theory as the moderns had given up the constant world view (Mayr, 1988, p.198-199). Common descent means branching. Different objects, like animals and plants, may be derived from a common ancestor (Mayr, 1988, p.200-202). Gradualism tells us that transformation is a slight and slow process, but not a sudden one. In the modern sense, it is defined as populational evolution that concerns with genetic changes (Mayr, 1988, p.202-205). The origin of vast organic diversity is explained by the multiplication of species. The "species multiply either by splitting into daughter species or by 'budding', that is, by the establishment of geographically isolated founder populations that evolve into new species" (Mayr, 1992, p.36). Natural selection explains that few individuals survive because of "well-adapted combination of inheritable characters." For the modern evolutionist, the production of new individuals is a complex process (Mayr, 1988, p.209; 1992, p.37).

Basis of Creation science

To understand the basis of Creation science, several questions need to be considered. What is the origin of life in Creationism? What evidences do they have to support their view? What is their claim to regard it as a science?

Creationists often use a watchmaker analogy to argue that there is a Creator. If one accepts that an intricate watch has a watchmaker; then one has to agree that humanity, life, earth and the universe have a Creator because all of these are more intricate than a watch. They also argue that such Creator "is general among all peoples and all cultures" (Asimov, 1984, p.184). Who is the Creator? The creationists' dogma lies on the Bible. They believe that the earth is formed 4004 B.C. (Ruse, 1982, p.285). Mankind is four days younger than the earth. Adam was the first human male and Eve, the first human female, was cloned from the body of Adam. Other animals are made within the first sixth days of Creation (Strahan, 1987, p.2). This is Creationists' belief in the origin of life and it is based on the Bible.

The Creation Research Society, founded in 1963, claims that the Book of Genesis is compatible with science and "provides a more scientific account of origins" (Strahan, 1987, p.7). Here comes Creation science. Creationists believe that God wrote the Bible, which implies that Genesis is indeed a true record of history and Flood is a real event. They claim that their belief can be justified. Consequently, Creationism is "an alternative scientific theory of world origins" and hence should be taught in schools (Ruse, 1982, p.291; Strahan, 1987, p.7). This is their claim. Whether or not it should be taught will be discussed in the Arkansas trial example.

Evolution versus Creation science

The crucial contrasts between evolution model and Creation model can be summarised as follows.

Evolution model predicts that galaxies keep changing over time, while Creation model suggests that it never change (Ruse, 1982, p.294; 1988, p.258); evolution model predicts "life evolved (and apparently is evolving) from non-life," while Creation model suggests life comes from another life (Ruse, 1982, p.295; 1988, p.258); evolution model says that origin changes slowly and gradually, while Creation model says that plant and animals are designed and completed at a moment; variation in evolution model is unlimited, while it is limited in Creation model (Gish, 1988, p.271).

An example of the key issues in dispute: the Arkansas trial

As can be seen from the previous section, evolution model and Creation model stand on opposite sides. These contraries open up the disputes. One of the arguments is that if evolution and Creation science should be taught in schools. Let us look at the Arkansas trial.

After the First World War, the teaching of evolutionism is prohibited in several states of the Union. In the 1960's the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the prohibition. Failing to exclude evolution in classrooms, Creationists tried to include Genesis into classrooms as well. They cried that Creation science should be taught alongside with evolution. In 1981, the state of Arkansas opened a talk for this issue. A bill, namely Act 590, was an attempt to balance the teachings on evolution and Creation science (Ruse, 1984, p.314-318).

In the court, Michael Ruse and the evolution supporters made seven major claims. First, the term "kinds" and "relatively recent" in the description of Creation science in Act 590 are ambiguous. It is weird that only one particular natural disaster, the Noah's Flood, is mentioned in Genesis. Second, the Act 590 act evolution wrong. Third, disproving evolution is not a sufficient condition to prove Creationism. Forth, they challenge the Creation science literature that "God used processes which are not now operating anywhere in the natural universe," hence Creation science failed to be a science. Fifth, the explanation and prediction in Creation science are not scientific. Creation science is indeed non-tentative. Sixth, Creation science is a dishonest. Seventh, Ruse argues that freedom of speech does not imply that Creation science can be taught in schools (Ruse, 1984, p.329-334).

The court decided that Creation science is a religion and should not be taught in schools, and Act 590 is overthrown. The evolutionists sort of won a victory.

My view

I have outlined the basis of Darwinian theory and Creation science. I have also discussed the contrast between evolution and Creation science with the Arkansas trial example. Now I shall proceed to present my view on this issue. To make things clear, let me restate the Creationists' claims. They argue that evolution is merely an idea and not scientific. In order to criticize their claims, I will first describe Kitcher's account of successful science. Then I will explain, using Kitcher's criteria, why is Creationists' argument flawed. Lastly, I shall challenge Morris's attack on evolution.

Philip Kitcher urges three characteristics of successful science: independent testability, unification and fecundity (1982, p.48). These are proper criteria for scientific theories. I shall use Einstein's story to demonstrate what Kitcher means. Kitcher claims that auxiliary hypotheses can be tested independently (1982, p.46). One hundreds year after Einstein's General Theory of Relativity is published, researchers from the Sloan Digital Sky Survey, using modern computer and new data, confirmed Einstein's theory (Sloan Digital Sky Survey, 2005, internet). Kitcher also claims that science is a coherent work (1982, p.47). According to Joe Wolfe, "Einstein's principle of relativity is just a generalisation of that of Galileo and Newton." Speed of light is deduced from Maxwell's equations (Wolfe, 2005, internet). Thus, relativity is not a closed theory. It makes uses of previous physicists' works and hence it is inseparable from many other physics laws. Moreover, relativity opens up researches on quantum mechanics.

I agree with Kitcher that Karl Popper's falsificationism can be replaced by the criteria given above. Many theories in modern science would be unfalsifiable. For example, as Kitcher states, Newtonian mechanics is unfalsifiable (1982, p.42-43). Since falsifiability unable to make demarcation, it fails to be a proper criterion. As a result, if the Creationist uses Popper's falsificationism to claim that evolution is not scientific, the argument is just unsound. Moreover, argues Kitcher, evolution is a science. Not only is the evolution unified, it opens up researches for contemporary biologists. It can be seen from the development of biology in the last two centuries (1982, p.53).

One central argument of the controversy is the age of the earth. History of the earth, argues Morris, begins at certain time. To start, one must rely on the Bible. If one rejects the possibility of God, then he is an atheist; and if one accepts that God exists, then he is the Creator (1963, p.29). I shall first point out that if one does not believe in Christian God, he is not necessary an atheist. He may believe God in other religions. In fact, Morris fails to give any evidence that why we must start with the Bible. With the discovery of radioactivity in the nineteenth century, physicists estimate the age of the earth to be 4.54 billion years (Bowler, 2000, internet). This contradicts what the Bible says. The reliability of Bible is being questioned. Morris moves on to argue that evolution is not taking place now (1963, p.31). Again, he fails to give convincing reasons. I have mentioned that evolution is not a sudden action and it is affecting contemporary biology. Morris then claims that Christian God, in contrast with evolution, finish his work in six days and "he is no longer creating anything" (1963, p.31-32). Unfortunately, this Creation fails to explain the diversity of life. By diversity I mean different kinds of species throughout history. Fossil records show that some animals exist before the Christian God created human. Dinosaur, which lived from 230 to 65 million years ago, is an example (Carpenter, 2000, internet). Morris admit that fossil record provide evidence (cited in Halstead, 1984, p.248). Palaeontologist Halstead does researches on fossils and draws conclusion to support evolution (1984, p.248-250).

Conclusion

Creationists attack evolution for several reasons. I have examined some of the crucial arguments and I cannot stand with them. Basically they fail to give strong evidence to support their views. So, their claim was flawed. Darwin's account of evolution is not just a "theory" in the sense of Creationists' view.



Acknowledgment

I thank John Schuster for his critique of my draft and Peter Slezak for his teaching.

Bibliography

Asimov, I. (1984) The "Threat" of Creationism. In Montagu, A. (ed.) Science and Creationism. Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Bowler, P.J. (2000) Geological Time: History of Ideas. Encyclopedia of Life Sciences. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Retrieved October 26, 2005, from http://www.els.net.wwwproxy0.nun.unsw.edu.au/
[doi:10.1038/npg.els.0001515]

Carpenter, K. (2000) Dinosauria (Dinosaurs). Encyclopedia of Life Sciences. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Retrieved October 26, 2005, from http://www.els.net.wwwproxy0.nun.unsw.edu.au/
[doi:10.1038/npg.els.0001545]

Darwin, C. (1964) On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Gish, D.T. (1988) Creation, Evolution, and the Historical Evidence. In Ruse, M. (ed.) But Is It Science? New York: Prometheus Books.

Halstead, L.B. (1984) Evolution: The Fossils Say Yes! In Montagu, A. (ed.) Science and Creationism. Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Kitcher, P. (1982) Abusing Science: the Case Against Creationism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Mayr, E. (1976) Evolution and the Diversity of Life. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Mayr, E. (1988) Toward a New Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Mayr, E. (1992) One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press.

Miller, K.R. (1984) Scientific Creationism Versus Evolution: The Mislabeled Debate. In Montagu, A. (ed.) Science and Creationism. Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Morris, H.M. (1963) The Twilight of Evolution. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co.

Ruse, M. (1982) Darwinism Defended. Menlo Park: The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, Inc.

Ruse, M. (1984) A Philosopher's Day in Court. In Montagu, A. (ed.) Science and Creationism. Oxford, New York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Ruse, M. (1988) Scientific Creationism. In Ruse, M. (ed.) But Is It Science? Prometheus Books: New York.

Sloan Digital Sky Survey (2005) SDSS uses 200,000 quasars to confirm Einstein's prediction of cosmic magnification. Retrieved October 24, 2005, from http://www.sdss.org/news/releases/20050426.magnification.html

Strahan, R. (1987) The Creationism Crusade. In Selkirk, D.R. and Burrows, F.J. (ed.) Confronting Creationism: Defending Darwin. Sydney: The New South Wales University Press, in association with the Australian Institute of Biology.

Wolfe, J. (2005) The Weirdness - and the Logic - of the Principle of Invariance of the Speed of Light. Retrieved October 24, 2005, from http://www.phys.unsw.edu.au/einsteinlight/jw/module3_weird_logic.htm

Attitudes towards Death and Dying

Course title: Knowledge and Reality – an Introduction to Epistemology and Metaphysics

Date: October 2005

Introduction

Confucius's student asked him about serving the dead and he avoided answering by saying, "While you do not know life, how can you know about death?" Someone claims that Confucius put his student off with the reason that the spirit of the death is obscure and unprofitable to discuss (Confucius, 1966, p.142). I disagree with this claim. People in early Chinese culture generally believe that they would have good fortune if they served the spirit of the dead. It can be seen throughout the Analects that Confucius avoids talking about the spirit of the dead in order to prevent people seeking good fortune in an unhealthy way. However, the issue of death is controversial and worth discussing.

It is the aim of this essay to discuss some philosophical attitudes towards death and dying. The central issues are: What kind of state is death? Socrates and Kant think that death is the separation of soul and body. The soul remains alive after the body is dead. I find this view unconvincing and will argue that both soul and body cease to exist after death. I will also attempt to explain what the implications of death for the existence of persons are and if death destroys what is good and valuable in a person's life. Feldman criticises Epicurus's argument that death is not bad, by arguing that death deprives one of life. I will argue against Feldman, using Rosenbaum's defense of Epicurus. Finally, I will discuss whether or not death can harm a person. Brueckner and Fischer claim that people generally prefer future experienced goods. Since posthumous nonexistence deprives one of future goods, the loss of existence is what people fear about death. I doubt that the prenatal and posthumous nonexistence are asymmetrical but deny Brueckner and Fisher's explanation. I accept, as Thomas Nagel says, there may be unconscious experience. But I do not put this in the deprivation argument of death.

What kind of state is death?

Before looking at the implication or harm of death, we must understand what death is and what state we are in after death. Most religions, like Judaism, Christianity and Islam, believe that people go to some type of heaven or hell after they die. However, human beings do not actually know where will they be after death. Since there is no obvious evidence to support this religious view, I shall assume that when humans die, they simply cease to exist.

Socrates and Simmias agree that death is the separation of soul and body. Philosophers do not have much concern for food, drink, sex, clothes, shoes and other bodily ornaments. The body is considered an obstacle to the practice of philosophy. Its desires, say wealth, cause war. Given that humans cannot attain pure knowledge as embodied beings, we have to do it after death or else we can never attain it (Plato, 1997, p.56-58). Kant has a similar idea. Animal and spiritual life are both parts of the human being. The body is a necessary condition for one to live. After death, it is the animal life that ceases to exist, but not the spiritual one. Death actually liberates the body, which is a hindrance to life (1997, p.94-96). This is unconvincing. If the soul of Kant still survives, what is "he" doing? What is "he" thinking? Even if "he" exists, "he" has no communication with this world. "He" cannot defense his moral theory, nor can "he" chat with "Socrates" in a coffee shop.

In contrast to Kant and Plato, Derek Parfit argues that, "after my death, there will no one living who will be me." His view about death is based on psychological attributes of personal identity, which focuses on one's memories and experiences. After one is dead, the future experience may be related to the present one indirectly. Death breaks the direct relation between these two experiences. Parfit cares less about his death because the future experience will not be related to his present one (1986, p.281-282). Basically, Parfit considers death as loss of personal identity. Parfit influences me, but I am not he. The person Parfit no longer exists. A Shakespearean play is in the style of Shakespeare but it is not the work of Shakespeare. I think Parfit's argument is sound because it describes the reality or the real world that we can observe. The claim that the soul survives is somewhat of a miracle and lacks evidence.

Maybe there is heaven or hell. Maybe there is nothing after death. Nobody knows. Nobody came from heaven or hell to tell us what happens there, just as nobody came from the future to tell us what is going to happen. We know nothing about those worlds. I shall focus on this world, the world that we are living in. Thus, in this short essay, let us assume the body and the soul both cease to exist in this world after death.

The implications of death for the existence of persons and if death destroys what is good and valuable in a person's life

Assuming one ceases to exist after death, we move on to discuss the implications of death and weather it destroys what is good and valuable in a person's life. Epicurus claims in his "Letter to Menoeceus" that as long as a person exists, he is not dead. After his death, he does not exist. A dead person has no sensation and hence death is not bad (cited in Feldman, 1994, p.128). As Feldman notices, Epicurus's argument makes sense if pleasure and pain, good and evil consist of as sensation only (p.131). Feldman then makes a distinction between something's being intrinsically and extrinsically bad. When a person suffers from a painful experience it is intrinsically bad. On the other hand, an extrinsically bad experience is not painful but it may cause someone to suffer in another way. Clearly, death is not intrinsically bad for a hedonist. However, death may be extrinsically bad. Something is extrinsically bad only if it leads to later intrinsic bads. With this causal hypothesis, Feldman modifies Epicurus's argument with the premises: if we have no feelings while death, then death is not an intrinsic bad; and death is not bad for the one who is dead only if death is not intrinsically bad for him. Feldman rejects the new version of the argument by arguing that the causal hypothesis is false. For example, a girl has a talent for poetry. However, she is born in a country, which does not allow females to read and write. Although she is satisfied with her life, Feldman thinks this is bad because she is deprived of a chance to be a successful poet. So things may be bad even if they are not intrinsically bad. He then suggests that "something is extrinsically bad for a person if and only if he or she would have been intrinsically better off if it had not taken place." Another example is a boy dies unconsciously while undergoing minor surgery. He will be happy if he had not died. Feldman thinks the boy's death is extrinsically bad because it deprives him of what he is going to enjoy (p.133-139).

In my opinion, this is where Feldman went wrong. I would hardly accept the view that death deprives someone of what he may have. Consider this argument: Franz Kafka's death in his early age is a misfortune for modern literature. I disagree with this. The argument assumes that if Kafka did not die young, he could write more good novels and short stories. However, even if Kafka could have lived longer, no one can ensure he would produce novels as great as his classics one, like America, the Castle, and the Trial. Suppose, for example, one would be very happy if he was rich. In fact he is not rich, I would not say "this is bad for him since his pleasures is deprived." Let us go back to the talented girl example. Living in a country that allows her to read and write does not guarantee that she will become a successful poet. Given that she enjoys her life, I would not consider her to have suffered on extrinsic bad. This is unlike eating poisoned candy. One will probably die after eating poisoned candy due to the fact that poisoned food causes death directly. The probability is high in this case. But the argument of deprivation is lack of certainty. The degree of certainty or probability is unknown in this case.

Unlike Feldman, Rosenbaum argues that death is not bad for the person being dead because he cannot experience it. Rosenbaum starts with emphasis on the importance of distinguishing dying, death and being dead. "Dying" is the process that causes one to be dead. "Death" is used broadly and usually unclearly. "Being dead" is the state after someone dies. Making these distinctions enable Rosenbaum to reconstruct Epicurus's argument: a person P's being dead is bad for P only for the state of affairs that P can experience at a certain time. P can only experience the state of affairs which begin before P's death. P's being dead is a state of affairs that begins after P's death. So P's being dead is not a state of affairs that P can experience at that time and hence it is not bad for P. Rosenbaum thinks that people fear the nonexistence of being dead rather than the moment of death itself (1993, p.120-122).

Rosenbaum's version of Epicurus's argument is sound because of his analysis of experience. What is really important to a person is his experience. The claim that "it is bad for a blind person because he can never see the painting of Leonardo da Vinci" is unsound. This claim makes an assumption that the blind person would enjoy viewing da Vinci's painting if he was not blind. The assumption is not necessarily true. Maybe he would think the Last Supper and the Mona Lisa are not aesthetically valuable. Thus, someone can experience only if he has ability to do so. He has ability only if he is alive. Conversely, one cannot experience after he dies.

Death cannot deprive one of what is good and valuable because the assumption that "he will have a better life if he was not dead" lacks certainty. Furthermore, as Epicurus argued, being dead is the state of nonexistence and hence cannot be experienced by anyone.

Harm of death

Insofar, I have assumed nonexistence after death and being dead does not necessary deprive one of a good life. What I have argued is that death is not bad for one who is dead, assuming he is not suffering when dying. If one suffered when dying, I would admit that is a bad experience for him. Also, if one does not enjoy his life, death is harmless to him. These are less debatable. However, many people do still fear death. Thus, we must consider if death can harm a person in another way.

Like Feldmam, Brueckner and Fischer agree that death can be bad because it deprives a person of goods. Brueckner and Fischer treat prenatal and posthumous nonexistence asymmetrically and hence death is bad because it deprives the good things of life. Prenatal nonexistence deprives past experienced goods, while death deprives future experienced goods. They illustrate this with an example. Someone was waiting for a drug test in a hospital. An hour of intense pleasure is induced after having the drug, but followed by amnesia. When he awoke, he was told that either he tried the drug or he is going to try it. Brueckner and Fischer claim that most people prefer the later case. That is, they did not try the drug and are going to have the pleasure. This explains that people care about their future experienced goods rather than past experienced goods (1993, p.227-228).

Again, the preference for future experienced goods is not a good analogy to the deprivation argument of death. Because pleasure is guaranteed in the thought experiment, while it is not the case for death. I would consider prenatal and posthumous nonexistence asymmetrically but use a different approach. It is without doubt that an unborn person does not exist. The current Prime Minister of Australia John Howard did not exist in 1900. He will not exist in this world after his death. However, the nonexistence after his death and the nonexistence of unborn Howard are not the same. Once John Howard is born, he is a part of and contributes to this world. After Howard is dead and assuming his soul ceases to exist, his name will be in the history book and his political view will not disappear. This is an extreme case, most of us will not in the history books. But the point I would like to emphasis is that once a person exists, he makes contribution to this world. Whether or not he is influential, no one can deny his existence. This draws the different between prenatal and posthumous nonexistence.

Thomas Nagel argues that a person may have unconscious experience, such as betrayal by friends, destruction of reputation and false rumors (cited in Rosenbaum, 1993, p.126). Betrayal by friends may be misfortune, but I deny that destruction of reputation and false rumors as bad experience. I would not bother if there were false rumors on me because they were not true. However, let me grant that people may have misfortune even if they do not know it. Nevertheless, this is not a proper analogy to regard death as a misfortune. Betrayed by friend is a bad unconscious experience due to the fact that it happened. In the da Vinci example I gave above, the blind person has no experience because he cannot see. I shall not conclude whether this is good or bad for him. I shall say someone is betrayed is bad because the betrayal happened and he lost his trust in his friends. Deprivation of good thing after death is an assumption without certainty. It did not happen. Hence it is harmless for the one who is dead.

What death really harms are the dead person's relatives, lover and friends. Consider the terrorist attacks, earthquakes and tsunami in recent years. It is the victims' relatives who suffered most, not the dead victim and the terrorist. It is humanity that makes us feel sad and differ from other animals. Furthermore, in some sense, the mortality gives meaning to life.

Conclusion

In brief, I assumed that both soul and body cease to exist after death. Then, I dissent from the view that death deprives one of future good experiences since it lacks certainty. Lastly, I claim that death harms the dead person's relatives rather than the one being dead. Other issues about death such as brain death; suffering when dying; its relation to personal identity, human cloning and meaning of life; and the problem of killing and euthanasia can be discussed further.



Acknowledgment

I am deeply indebted to Jennifer Bleazby. She helped me a lot in my introductory philosophy courses (Thinking about Reasoning, Knowledge and Reality) and especially this essay.

Bibliography

Brueckner, A.L. and Fischer, J.M. (1993) Why Is Death Bad? In Fischer, J.M. (ed.) The Metaphysics of Death. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Confucius (1966) Confucian Analects. The Four Books: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Works of Mencius (trans. Legge, J.). New York: Pargon Book Reprint Corp.

Feldman, F. (1994) Confrontations with the Reaper. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kant, I. (1997) Lectures on Metaphysics (trans. Ameriks, K. and Naragon, S.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Parfit, D. (1986) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Plato (1997) Phaedo (trans. Grube, G.M.A.). In Cooper, J.M. (ed.) Plato Complete Works. Hackett.

Rosenbaum, S.E. (1993) How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of Epicurus. In Fischer, J.M. (ed.) The Metaphysics of Death. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.