Spinoza Ethics

9/7/2006 - 星期日 Sunday

Spinoza defines finite, in his Ethics, as follows: "That things is said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited by another of the same nature." (translated by Edwin Curley) We compare things in its own kind. For example, computers are finite machines. The speed and capacity of any computer are limited. You can get the fastest computer today, but a faster one will be made tomorrow. But what about the whole set of computers, is there any limit? Take natural number as another example. You pick any natural number n, I can find a larger one, say n+1. Thus, there is no maximum natural number. The set of natural number is infinite.

Spinoza then defines God as an absolutely infinite being, or "a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence." This is imprecise. What is an absolutely infinite being exactly? He explains that "if something is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence." The concept of infinite is vague.

If we don't accept what Spinoza defines, his proposition simply doesn't follow. For instance, if we adopt John Dalton's atomic theory instead of Spinoza's definition of substances, proposition like "one substance cannot be produced by another substance" is flawed.

Ethics is written as the style of Euclid's Elements. Although they both face criticisms, Elements are so solid, at least scientifically sufficient; while the arguments in the Ethics, if anyone likes, are not undeniable.

Though I don't feel like, I've to admit that most ethical arguments are not unbeatable. Take utilitarian theories as an example. If one reject the concept of good and bad, utilitarian theories, no matter how sound, can be overthrown. I'm saying that ethical theory can be sound, and providing such argument is the best you can do. These days, people just don't care about ethic and moral. Persuade them? Argue with them? They don't bother to.